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Editor's note In this paper Mr Stalley explores the role of the doctor through comparing and contrasting medicine and politics, but aims to illuminate the role of the physician rather than look at the nature of politics as many previous philosophers have done. Mr Stalley takes the extremes of the doctor as a 'philosopher king' and then as a 'technician' to illustrate the point that either one of these roles would seriously threaten the freedom of the individual to choose. The role of the doctor as an adviser, he feels, is much more what we want and need, as in that role he is more likely to combine scientific knowledge with the ability to achieve a sympathetic understanding of his fellow beings.
From very early times philosophers have made comparisons between medicine and politics or between the role of the physician and that of the politician or statesman. These comparisons have generally been intended to cast light on the nature of politics but in this paper I wish to consider whether they can also illurminate the role of the physician.
The philosophers who have compared medicine and politics have adopted widely divergent attitudes to the comparison. Plato, for example, seems to have believed that the two pursuits are precisely parallel to one another: in medicine we must bow to the authority of the expert physician and in politics to that of the wise statesman.' Some modem philosophers, on the other hand, have assumed that medicine and politics are contrasting rather than parallel cases: we may submit to authority in medicine but must on no account do so in politics.2 I suspect that there are also many who would argue for a third position, that neither in politics nor in medicine should the individual give up his autonomy: in medicine ultimate authority must rest with the patient, in politics with the individual citizen.
I shall begin by considering two possible models for the role of the doctor in society. The first is that of the philosopher king. In his Republic, Plato suggests that in an ideal society all political power would be entrusted to rulers (usually known as 'guardians' or 'philosopher kings') It is easy to over-emphasise diversities and disagreements in values. Cooperative activity of any kind is possible only to the extent that individuals can work for common goals. In practice human beings, particularly those brought up in the same culture, share many of their values and attitudes. Another important feature of humamty as we know it is the ability to achieve a sympathetic understanding of one another's values even when we do not share them. This enables us to give one another advice, to engage in joint deliberation and to adopt common policies. If values were purely a matter of individual whim or arbitrary choice then we would be able only to shout at and coerce one another. Still the fact remains that however knowledgable or thoughtful an individual is, this knowledge or thoughtfulness cannot in itself give him the right to determine other people's lives. The medical profession cannot therefore claim the role ofphilosopher kings even where matters of health are concerned. Whenever possible the ultimate decision must be left with the patients, just as in politics it must be left with the individual citizens. We can thus sum up our discussion of the philosopher king model by saying that it destroys the autonomy of the patient and does so largely because it is an erroneous account of knowledge.
Doctors as technicians
Put in its boldest and barest form the technician model suggests that it is the role of the doctor to inform his patient of the facts and then to carry out the patient's instructions. There is no call on the doctor to make any substantial decisions. The main trouble with this, of course, is that it denies the responsibility we all have for our own acts. All of us, even plumbers or carpenters, must be prepared to accept responsibility for what we do. For plumbers and carpenters this may not be much of a burden, because they are not usually concerned with matters of great moral importance; they are not often asked to do something which might be morally wrong, and it is usually clear whose instructions they are to follow. Things are not so easy for doctors; their acts, which may concern matters of life and death, are of great moral
The role of the doctor: technician or statesman ? 2I importance; they may be asked to do things (eg abortions, euthanasia or AID) which are either immoral or of unclear ethical status; the patient may be obviously incapable of taking a decision or (even more difficult) it may not be clear whether he can take such responsibility; medical treatment may also affect other people besides the patient, for example his family, the medical staff who will be involved in treatment, the wider community which will pay for it or even an unborn fetus; so it may not be clear to whom exactly the doctor is responsible, or he may have to weigh up conflicting claims. For reasons such as these the work of doctors is bound to involve substantial moral decisions. These responsibilities cannot be evaded by appealing to higher authorities such as the law or professional ethical codes. Decisions of Parliament or of ethical panels must influence doctors but nobody, however august, can determine what is right or wrong; the ultimate responsibility still lies with the individual physician.
The technician model is based on the assumption that there is a clear distinction between setting the facts of the case before the patient and taking decisions on his behalf. This, too, seems highly dubious. Because information is complex, doctors will be obliged to be selective in what they tell their patients. Obviously it will not be possible to describe every conceivable treatment which could be given. Doctors will select what to say in the light of the treatment goals as they understand them; they will ignore courses which they regard as unethical, harmful, absurdly expensive or simply irrelevant to the patient's needs. The decision what to say to the patient thus depends on the ultimate values that are being pursued.
The language which the layman uses in discussing and thinking about health in relation to everyday life is full of evaluative and emotional overtones; one has only to think of words like 'pain', 'sickness' and 'death'. The attitudes of ordinary people to health and sickness are largely determined by those of the medical profession. For example mental conditions such as depression were not, I believe, regarded as illnesses until doctors began to treat them as such. So the attitude of the profession determines whether we see these as faults of character, to be overcome by personal effort, or as conditions for which we have no personal responsibility which are to be overcome by medical intervention. Similarly, professional attitudes may determine whether we accept some physical debilities as inevitable accompaniments of advancing age or resent them in the same way as we would disease or injury.
In one way there is a danger of overstating these points. Obviously doctors do not, and cannot be expected to go into moral agonies at every consultation. None of us could cope with life if we did not take certain values for granted. We have to evolve our own attitudes and operate with these more or less unconsciously. In doing this we are, of course, heavily influenced by the assumptions of the communities within which we live and of our various professions. The danger of the technician model is that it denies the existence of such valuepresuppositions and concentrates attention entirely on the doctor's factual knowledge. If we fail to recognise this we may invest the attitudes of the medical profession with the authority of science. This, I take it, is one of the main points behind Ivan Illich's attacks on modern medicine.5 A certain set of values becomes institutionalised within the medical establishment. Once this happens it becomes very difficult for those involved in medicine, whether as doctors or patients, to question these values and we lose the freedom to choose differently. In this way the technician model can be more threatening than the philosopher king, because it involves a concealed, rather than an open and explicit, domination, one which is the more difficult to evade because it is not exercised by any particular individuals.
Doctors as advisers
As patients we look to our doctors for advice. There are, of course, two kinds of advice. One kind involves giving a factual account of how a particular goal may be achieved. The other involves a positive recommendation as to what is or is not to be done. I think most of us would be disturbed if our doctors restricted themselves to the purely factual kind of advice; we expect also to receive recommendations; in other words we expect our doctors to play a positive role in decision-making. It is sometimes suggested that the doctor should do this because he is able to see the situation from a more detached, balanced and unemotional point of view, but I suspect most patients could find some other adviser who was equally balanced and unemotional and certainly less involved. So it is not the detachment or balanced attitude of the doctor that qualifies him to take an active part in decision making. What, I think, qualifies him for this role is his experience. Most patients who have to decide whether to undergo a course of treatment have no personal experience of the kinds of situation between which they are, in effect, choosing. Even if friends or relatives have suffered similar conditions in the past they will constitute a small and unreliable sample. So, however carefully the doctor describes the facts of what will happen, the patient may have very little idea of 'what it will really be like'. A doctor who has seen many patients in similar circumstances will, for that reason, be much better equipped to decide whether treatment is really worthwhile. So the question 'What would you do if you were in my position, doctor?' is entirely appropriate.
Advice can be given only to the extent that human beings can share or, at least, enter sympathetically into one another's values. After all there is no reason why we should listen to recommendations based on a completely alien set of values. We prefer therefore, to look for advice to someone whose ultimate values are the same as our own but we can also seek advice from someone who does not share our values if he is able to understand and enter imaginatively into our goals. Ideally the help of an adviser will enable us to realise our own ultimate values more effectively than we could so by ourselves. So advice-giving depends on the capacity of human beings to understand one another, not in the way in which scientists understand natural phenomena, but by understanding what it is like to be in a person's position and being able temporarily to make his goals our goals.
In addition to looking to dQctors for advice we also expect them to take decisions on our behalf. We do not expect even to be consulted on all the details of treatment. So our doctors exercise a delegated responsibility for us. The delegation of responsibility also depends on the capacity to share and understand one another's goals. (If we delegate responsibility to someone whose aims are completely different from our own then we are simply abandoning our own aims.) Thus when we seek the help of the medical profession we are relying on them, not simply as purveyors offactual information, but as human beings who are capable of understanding and working towards the ends which we ourselves value. We rely on the humnan understanding as much as on the technical knowledge of our doctors. The trouble with the philosopher king and technician models is that they both, in different ways, deny this point.
Medicine and politics
Thinkers of the past have often talked as though politics was exclusively concerned with relationships in which one party gives orders and the other passively obeys. In fact this is scarcely ever the case. Politics, in its widest sense, is concerned with communal action; it thus involved reconciling conflicting goals, giving advice and delegating decisions. These activities require the same virtues of human understanding which I have suggested are needed by doctors. They do not require the special knowledge of the philosopher king. So the analogy between medicine and politics is a good one, but not for the reasons Plato supposed. The essential point is that both pursuits require not just scientific or factual knowledge nor any special expertise in matters of value but the ability to achieve a sympathetic understanding of one's fellow beings.
These points have, I think, been recognised by the medical profession and by the wider publicwitness that stock character of fiction, the wise old family doctor whose virtue is a deep understanding of his fellow men, rather than a mastery of modem medical techniques. But there may well be a danger that factors such as shortage of time, increasing specialisation and the growth of medical technology may lead to the replacement of such medical statesmen by medical technologists -another stock figure of fiction is the bright young doctor in the white coat. There are corresponding dangers in politics. It is claimed that the growth of technology and the increasing complexity of the matters with which governments are concerned make it more difficult for ordinary individuals to influence the political process.6 Plato, of course, did not envisage these developments but in one of his later works he says something which may serve us as an epilogue.7 He contrasts free and slave doctors. The free doctors, in addition to being free men themselves, mostly have free men as patients; they take time with them and try to educate them as to what they should do to be cured. The slave doctors are slaves themselves and treat mostly slaves; they rush around from patient to patient and issue orders without attempting to explain the reasons. It would be exaggerated, but not absurd, to fear that technology may make slaves of us all.
